MarmiteLover123 [comrade/them, comrade/them]

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Cake day: September 19th, 2022

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  • The 80 or so F-16s Europe are planing to send are:

    • not domestically produced or supported, they are built in the United States and rely on support (spare parts and maintenance) from the United States itself, hence the recent US $300 million F-16 support package and flights of spare parts and stripped out airframes from the boneyard in the US. They also rely on US weapons/munitions, targeting equipment and intelligence, electronic systems/countermeasures and technicians. Europe cannot provide this support, only the United States can. Europe sending F-16s without US support would amount to sending a bunch of soft locked aircraft that wouldn’t be able to carry out the required missions. I wrote a long post about this when the USA paused intelligence sharing to Ukraine. It’s US technology, not European technology. The US is required as a key player.

    • The F-16s Europe are sending are cold war era F-16AM block 15 models, roughly equivalent in capability to the Soviet era MiG-29s Ukraine has/had. These are not the latest F-16V block 70 aircraft, or even the 2000s era F-16C block 50 aircraft. These are the oldest F-16s in service. They lack a lot of capabilities that the newest F-16s have, from radars to targeting systems.

    • It is only possible for Europe to send these F-16s because the United States is prepared to supply F-35s as a replacement for those countries giving up their F-16s. Europe has no domestic equivalent to the F-35, and their latest 4.5 generation aircraft (Gripen, Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon) while cheaper to operate than an F-35, cost more upfront and lack stealth capabilities. In theory this is a win-win situation: European countries trade in their cold war era F-16AMs to Ukraine for the latest and greatest F-35s, and the US makes a ton of money on arms sales. But again, this plan requires the US as a key player to work. It’s not possible without US involvement. Europe cannot supply the replacements that the US can.

    • As for domestically produced fighter aircraft, France was able to promise a dozen or two Mirage 2000s, but that was it. No one else from Europe has stepped up. This seems to be all that Europe can give independently. Macron said as much.

    • The storm shadow/SCALP-EG missiles are fired by Soviet era Su-24 aircraft in the Ukrainian inventory using parts from the UK’s Tornado GR4 aircraft. It’s a frankenstein solution.

    This is not to say that Europe doesn’t have high tech weapons in general, they do. But the stuff that they do have they need to keep for themselves for their own domestic security, they cannot support another conflict and keep themselves at the appropriate readiness levels. There are also key shortfalls in certain areas (like air defence) where Europe does not have the domestic production capability, and relies on partners like the US and Israel for them. Hence Germany buying an Israeli Arrow 3 air defence battery (midcourse ballistic missile interception) recently.





  • doubt

    US generals are not idiots, they’re not going to sail their Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) straight into a hailstorm of Anti Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) equipped with either Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs) or Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) as warheads. The Chinese DF-17 HGV equipped ASBM, and the DF-21D MaRV equipped ASBM, have a range of around 1600km/1000mi. The DF-21 is said to be a Chinese equivalent to the now retired Pershing-II from the United States. So these weapons will act as area denial weapons, with the CSGs remaining outside of their effective range during the majority of their operations. Aircraft will rely on mid air refueling and/or external drop tanks to have the required range to conduct missions from this far out. This of course restricts their operations, but they can still carry out missions. This is also why there’s a huge focus on increasing the internal fuel capacity and range for the US Navy’s 6th generation strike fighter (F/A-XX), and why the F-35C has such a large internal fuel capacity.

    Pershing-II (left), hypothesised DF-21D MaRV on top of DF-15 booster stage (centre), DF-21 with nosecone shield (right):

    DF-17 with DF-ZF HGV:

    We can see this in Yemen in the Red Sea (where ASBMs were used as weapons for the first time in history), where the USS Harry Truman aircraft carrier spends the majority of time around Jeddah, around 700-800km away from the Houthi/Ansarallah controlled parts of Yemen, and resupplies at Yanbu. This keeps them out of range of the Zulfiqar Basir MaRV equipped ASBM (700km range) during normal operations, and keeps them out of range of Anti Ship Cruise Missiles like the Abu Mhadi (1000km range) when resupplying.

    Zulfiqar Basir, with a close up on the electro optical sensor on the MaRV for terminal guidance:

    Area denial is still a great capability to have, but ASBMs aren’t magic wands that can just eliminate CSGs. They have their own limitations, hitting a moving target such as a ship with a ballistic missile, even one equipped with a HGV or MaRV, is quite complex, especially at longer ranges where you’d have to provide midcourse guidance updates and resulting trajectory changes to a ballistic missile in space. This is why longer range ASBMs aren’t there yet. To try extend the effective range of existing ASBM platforms, they could be launched from aircraft, which give a small range boost from the launch point, and allowing the aircraft to fly out over sea before launching, for a combined range extension (aircrafts range + ASBM range). China does have the KF-21, an air launched DF-21. The challenge then becomes avoiding the launch aircraft being intercepted by hostile combat air patrols before launching, such patrols will limit how far out the launch aircraft can fly.

    Air launched DF-21 variant mounted on a Xian H-6, the two solid fueled booster rocket stages and MaRV are clearly visible.

    The article mentions equipping a longer range ballistic missile like the DF-27 with a DF-ZF HGV, but I don’t think that’s practical over the ranges mentioned (8000km/5000mi). The DF-ZF is not designed to glide at hypersonic speeds for such a long distance, so your glide phase would take up a small part of the overall flight profile, meaning that such a platform would act like a conventional ballistic missile for the majority of it’s flight time. The DF-ZF is also not designed to handle atmospheric re-entry at the higher speeds and loads that such an extended range would require. A new HGV would be needed.